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APPLYING THE BAD FAITH DOCTRINE TO THE
PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE CARRIER
RELATIONSHIP IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
As juries persistently award sizeable verdicts in personal injury
claims, there is a concomitant surge in exposure of assured defendants
to judgments far in excess of insurance policy limits.' Since the in-
surer has the dual responsibility of indemnifying the assured for losses
covered by the policy and providing the assured with a defense,2 the
fact that the assured's personal assets may be jeopardized by an "ex-
cess" judgment often creates situations in which the insurer's interests
conflict with those of the assured.3 In order to protect assureds in
such situations, California courts have implied a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing extending from insurance companies to their as-
sureds,4 a breach of which gives rise to a cause of action with mixed
1. Bloom, Recovery Against Primary Insurer By Excess Carrier For Bad Faith Or
Negligent Failure To Settle, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 235 (1969).
2. In return for these promises on the part of the insurer, the assured must relinquish
control of the litigation and terms of settlement. The "Travelers Personal Automobile
Policy," Policy Forms 100, 102, and LP (2d ed); Policy Forms 101, at 3, for example,
provides, in part:
mhe company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the in-
sured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even
if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may
make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient
Generally, this is an advantageous relationship since the assured benefits from the com-
pany's expertise in claims handling, while the company has control of the litigation in
order to protect its financial interest. The problem occurs, however, when both the
financial interests of the assured and the company are at stake, i.e., when there is a
risk of a judgment in excess of the available coverage.
3. Situations in which trials result in judgments in excess of policy limits are com-
monly referred to as "excess judgments." The position of the assured in this context
was vividly described by one author:
The insurance company, of course, being in the business, plays the law of averages.
The policyholder who is in court perhaps for the only time in his life cannot af-
ford to concern himself with "averages." There is no averaging so far as he is
concerned-this is his lawsuit.
Appleman, Circumstances Creating Excess Liability, 1960 INs. L.J 553, 554. See also
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility For Settlement, 67 HtAv. L. REv. 1136,
1169 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
4. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958).
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tort/contract colors, commonly termed "bad faith."5
The "bad faith" concept encompasses three distinct relationships.
Initially, the concept is applicable in "third party" suits commonly
arising out of auto accidents. 6 In such cases, an injured third party
files a complaint alleging personal injuries caused by the assured de-
fendant and praying for damages in excess of the assured's available
insurance coverage. The plaintiff attorney then makes a settlement
offer for a figure within the policy limits. For whatever reason, the
offer is refused, and the case goes to trial, resulting in an excess judg-
ment against the assured and a bad faith claim by the assured against
the insurer.
Secondly, bad faith applies to "first party" suits wherein the claim
is pursued not by a stranger to the insurance contract, but by the
assured himself.7 For example, an assured might pursue a bad faith
claim if a fire insurer refused indemnity for losses falling within the
coverage of the assured's policy.
Significantly, bad faith has begun its extension into a third type
of insurance relationship: primary-excess insurer suits.8 There, the
assured has coverage with two distinct insurers; one, an insurer who
assumes, as the name suggests, the "primary" obligation to defend
and/or indemnify the insured from third party suits; and, the other
insurer, called upon to indemnify the insured only in the event of a
judgment or settlement in "excess" of the primary insurer's policy lim-
its. If the primary insurer refuses a settlement offer and a subsequent
excess judgment results in excess carrier liability, a suit between the
excess carrier and the primary carrier for bad faith is likely.
5. See 2 B. WrrI, CALiFoRNIA PROCEDuRE 969 (2d ed. 1970); Comunale v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958). The court speaks of
the cause of action for bad faith as "sounding both in contract and tort" with the plain-
tiff having the power to elect. Id. But see Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App.
2d 788, 799, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1964) (held the cause of action was solely in
contract). This distinction becomes critical when considering the nature of damages
that can be obtained and whether or not the cause of action can be assigned.
One author, after reviewing Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), stated that the bad faith area had been chosen by the
plaintiff's bar (regarding personal injury cases) as one of its "prime targets" in terms
of amici curiae support for the future. Snyder, Defense in Excess of Policy Limit Liti-
gation, 18 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 9, 12 (Winter 1968) [hereinafter cited as Snyder].
6. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958).
7. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232,
102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
8. See text accompanying notes 48-64 infra.
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Despite the obvious importance of the issue, California has yet
to determine the applicability of the bad faith concept to the primary-
excess insurer relationship. This Comment, after exploring necessary
background, i.e., the contours of the bad faith cause of action in third
and first party contexts, will argue that California should decline to
extend the bad faith cause of action into the primary-excess arena.
I. THm THnR= PARTY CONTEXT
The first California case to adopt the bad faith cause of action
in a third party context, Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co.,9 sharply
confined the limits of the action:
[W]e are convinced that only bad faith should be the basis of the
insured's cause of action. Bad faith may involve negligence, or negli-
gence may be indicative of bad faith, but negligence alone is insuffi-
cient to render the insurer liable. 10
In Merritt v. Reserve Insurance Co., this proposition was reaf-
9. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
10. Id. at 688-89, 319 P.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
11. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973). There, the insurer had issued
a policy of insurance with $100,000 policy limits to the J.A. Stafford Trucking
Company. A Stafford truck was rear-ended by a track driven by Merritt on Highway
99. The statement of a witness, Cox, indicated that Merritt's truck passed him at about
60 miles per hour and "whipped" back into the slow lane, colliding with the slower
moving Stafford truck. The California Highway Patrol accident report confirmed the
witness' account of the accident. Merritt then filed a suit against Stafford and its
driver for $400,000 in bodily injury damages. Stafford was informed via an "excess
letter" that the complaint's prayer was in excess of the available insurance coverage.
Because of Merritt's extensive injuries and the size of the workmen's compensation
lien, the insurer's defense counsel ruled out "any possibility of even considering or dis-
cussing settlement." Furthermore, based on the favorable witness statement and Cali-
fornia Highway Patrol accident report, the case was assessed as "one of no liability."
The case went to trial without the plaintiff's attorney asserting a demand for settlement
within the policy limits and ended with a plaintiff's verdict totaling $434,000. Staf-
ford then assigned its cause of action for bad faith to Merritt.
Merritt alleged, among other things, that Reserve Insurance (Stafford's insurer) was
negligent in that it had (1) failed to initiate settlement discussions; and (2) ineptly
handled the assured's defense. The court concluded that: "With respect to the first
charge, negligent failure to initiate settlement discussions, . . . actionable failure to
settle must encompass bad faith . . . negligence alone is insufficient to support the
charge." Id. at 880, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
Regarding the second count of negligently litigating the matter, the court stated: "We
do not accept the claim that vicarious liability falls on one who retains independent
trial counsel to conduct litigation on behalf of a third party when retained counsel have
conducted the litigation negligently." Id. However, the court's conclusion is question-
able. Professor Keeton for example, has written:
If the attorney fails to give proper consideration to the interests of insured in his
recommendation that a settlement offer be declined, and the company acts on that
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firmed: "The cases unanimously agree that in considering a carrier's
recommendation causing a loss to insured, insured has a cause of action against
company but not against the attorney.
Keeton, supra note 1, at 1169. See also 7A J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4687, at 479-80 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN];
G. COUCH, 14 CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURAN CE LAW § 51, at 133 (2d ed. R. Anderson (1965);
Comment, Insurer's Liability for Judgments Exceeding Policy Limits, 38 TEXAs
L. R.v. 233, 247 (1949).
Counsel employed by the insurer has been deemed a subagent of the insurer acting
for the best interests of the assured in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Highway Ins. Un-
derwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904, 932 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948), where the court stated:
Responsibility for Insured's defense rested upon Insurer not upon Insurer's
agents. The judgment which was to be formed in determining whether Insurer
would accept Alexander's offer was Insurer's judgment, not the judgment of the
lawyers who defended Insured and advised Insurer.
The court concluded that any contrary result would reduce the insurer's obligation to
nothing more than retention of competent counsel, thereby relieving the insurer of the
duty of good faith and due care. Id. But see Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
285 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1972) (reliance on the advice of counsel is a good defense to an
action for bad faith).
In Dumas v. Hartford Ins. Co., 56 A.2d 57 (N.H. 1947), an action for negligent
failure to settle within the policy limits, the court was of the opinion that "profes-
sional negligence of counsel is imputed to the client when his attorney is acting within
the scope of his authority." Id. at 61. See also Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the insurer's duty to its assured is
non-delegable and, therefore, cannot be satisfied by the retention of competent counsel);
and Farmers Gin Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 191 So. 415 (Miss. 1939) (in-
dicating that although counsel retained by the insurer exercises expertise, he is not an
independent contractor). It should be noted that insurers have made it a practice to
inform their assureds by letter of the fact that a suit has been filed claiming damages
in excess of their available coverage. Assureds are then generally advised that they
may retain personal counsel to protect their interests at their own expense. Insurers
adopted this course of conduct in order to guard against any contentions of "waiver,"
i.e., that by litigating the matter without apprising the assured of the personal liability
exposure, they waive the limits of the policy.
The following is a sample letter used by one Los Angeles defense firm:
Gentlemen:
You had previously requested that this insurance company assume your defense.
In assuming this defense we wish to spell out the extent and nature of the cover-
age available to you.
In reviewing the ...Complaint filed by the [plaintiff], we note that they seek
to recover damages against you of $500,000.00 punitive damages, $50,000.00 gen-
eral damages, their attorneys fees and loss of income.
The limit of liability under your insurance policy is [$ .
and for that reason any part of the judgment in excess of $
will have to be paid by you.
Your insurance policy does not provide coverage for any portion of a judgment
which may be awarded by way of punitive damages ...
In light of the above, you therefore have a personal interest in the defense of
this suit. This company will afford a defense to the action on your behalf without
any expense to you. However, in view of your excess liability and the portions
of the claim for which no coverage is provided, we wish to advise you that you
may, if you so desire, associate your own counsel with ours in the defense. This,
of course, would be done at your own expense . ..
Very truly yours,
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liability for rejection of an offer to settle within policy limits the test is
bad faith and not negligence.'
2
Despite the language of Brown and Merritt,13 there are few, if
any, situations where an insurer can act negligently and not evince
bad faith.' 4
Indeed, the year following the Brown decision, the California Su-
preme Court decided a case which narrowed the gap between negli-
gence and bad faith. In Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance
Co., 5 the court recognized that:
But see Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799,
94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971) (wherein the court stated that insurers are responsible for
the payment of attorney's fees of the assured's independent counsel if the retention was
necessitated by a conflict of interest).
12. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
13. There is additional language excluding negligence as a basis of bad faith in Ivy
v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958), wherein the
court, citing Brown, concluded:
There is some conflict as to whether liability in such cases is predicated on neg-
ligence or upon bad faith. California has recently aligned itself with the jurisdic-
tions that apply the bad faith test. In that well reasoned opinion [Brown] . . .
the court collects and discusses most of the pertinent authorities on the subject,
rejects the negligence test, and applied the bad faith test.
Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 145-46 (citations omitted). See also Martin v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1964), wherein the court
commented:
The defense need not have made anything like an accurate prediction of what a
jury would do. Nevertheless, the verdict itself is one indication of what the com-
pany might have anticipated. We mean, of course, according to the test of good
faith, and not of ordinary care, because this type of action is not based upon neg-
ligence.
Id. at 183, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 346 (citations omitted). See also Palmer v. Financial
Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 428, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1963); Comment, Excess
Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18 STAN. L. REv.
475 (1966).
14. Witness some of the factors listed in Brown as indicia of bad faith:
ItMhe strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and damages;
. . . failure of the insurer to properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascer-
tain the evidence against the insured; the insurer's rejection of advice of its own
attorney or agent; failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise
offer; the amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed in the event
of a refusal to settle.
155 Cal. App. 2d at 689, 319 P.2d at 75.
15. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). The defendant-assured, Sloan, who had
struck Mr. and Mrs. Comunale in a crosswalk had policy limits of $20,000 for each
accident and $10,000 per person. The insurer refused to defend the negligence action
based on the fact that Sloan was driving a non-owned vehicle at the time of the acci-
dent. The insurer also refused a settlement offer of $4,000 and the jury returned
a verdict for a total of $26,250 (that being $16,250 over the $10,000 per person
limit). The supreme court based its finding of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing on Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949), a case
involving an agreement between parties to make certain dispositions of property by will
at death.
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There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right
of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.10
Since insurance policies are nothing more than contracts for insurance,
the court stated, without discussion, that the implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing applies and requires insurers to settle in appro-
priate cases even in the absence of express terms in the policy im-
posing such a duty.'" In Comunale, the insurer denied coverage under
the policy' 8 and rejected an offer of settlement in circumstances where
In Comunale, the assured had assigned his cause of action for bad faith against the
insurer to the prevailing plaintiff (judgment creditor) in the underlying bodily injury
action. As is the practice, the assured received in return for his assignment, the plain-
tiffs promise, in covenant form, not to execute against the assured on the unsatisfied
judgment. The validity of this assignment procedure was upheld in Comunale.
Bad faith actions of the excess judgment variety are commonly maintained by a judg-
ment creditor of the assured who has been assigned the assured's cause of action either
by the assured himself, as in Comunale, or by a trustee in bankruptcy of the assured
should the judgment have forced the defendant assured into bankruptcy. See Reichert
v. General Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968); cf. Young
v. American Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969), petition for cert. dismissed, 396 U.S.
997 (1970); Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961); Com-
unale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Critz v. Farm-
ers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964).
16. 50 Cal. 2d at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. There is some controversy as to whether
a failure to accept a reasonable settlement is a breach of the covenant of good faith
or is an instance of bad faith, the issue being whether the bad faith concept is included
in or separate from the breach of the implied covenant of good faith. See Hills &
Pivnicka, Development and Direction of the California Bad Faith Insurance Doctrine
or "0 Ye of Little Faith," 8 U. SAN FRANcIsco L. Rnv. 29, 32-33 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Hills].
17. 50 Cal. 2d at 658-59, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
18. Should an insurer believe that there is no coverage for the loss, it must take
appropriate measures to adjudicate the coverage question without jeopardizing the
chances for settlement. Often, insurers provide a defense to the bodily injury action
under a "reservation of rights" and litigate the coverage issue independent of the bodily
injury action.
As a practical matter, insurers are reluctant not to provide a defense to an assured,
in light of Gray v. Zurich, 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr, 104 (1966).
That decision had the effect of severely limiting the situations where an insurer could
afford to withhold a defense where a dispute over coverage of the lawsuit arose. The
court articulated the rule thus:
Since modern propedural rules focus on the facts of a case rather than the theory
of recovery in the complaint, the duty to defend should be fixed by the facts which
the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources. An insurer,
therefore, bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts which
give rise to the potential of liability under the policy.
Id. at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13 (emphasis added).
In Gray, the assured had been sued for an assault and battery resulting from an
altercation in an intersection while operating the insured vehicle. The policy, as is
normal with most policies, excluded coverage for damage caused by intentional conduct
1974] BAD FAITH
a great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits existed. The court
held the company liable for the entire judgment and concluded:
When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so that
the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement
which can be made within those limits, a consideration in good faith
of the insured's interest requires the insurer to settle the claim.19
Invariably, in applying this test to a particular fact situation, the "rea-
sonableness" of the insurer's or his counsel's conduct becomes the sub-
ject of the court's scrutiny. Although no specific guidelines as to what
constitutes reasonableness were defined, the court alluded to a balanc-
ing of the assured's interests with those of the insurer:
The insurer, in deciding whether a claim should be compromised, must
take into account the interest of the insured, and give it at least as
much consideration as it does to its own interest.2 0
as violative of the public policy of the state which opposes insuring against one's
intentional wrongdoing.
Although the duty to defend and indemnify are separate and distinct obligations upon
an insurer, an insurer may inadvertently waive any coverage defenses it might possess
and be forced to indemnify unless it communicates to the assured the fact that it gra-
tuitously provides a defense and "reserves" the right to later adjudicate the coverage
issues bearing on the insurer's duty to indemnify. See generally R. KEaTON, BASIC
TFxT ON INsURANcE LAw 410, 429-30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KEETON].
19. 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201 (1958) (emphasis added).
20. Id. Comunale indicates that in California the insurer can weigh its own inter-
ests equally with that of the insured when considering a settlement. This same rule
applies to insurance defense counsel. Counsel may consider both the assured and
the carrier as his clients, providing the dual representation is communicated to both
clients. Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968). There,
a collision resulted in the death of three persons with probable liability in the Rarden
estate (both the plaintiff and the assured had perished in the accident). The Lysick
estate brought a wrongful death action against the Rarden estate with a prayer in ex-
cess of the policy limits of $10,000. Plaintiff made a demand for $10,000, but Rar-
den's attorney, Walcom, adhered to his counteroffer of $9,500. The carrier
had given Walcom authority to offer the limits at the "propitious" moment. Walcom
finally offered the limits one week prior to trial, but the offer was rejected. The case
resulted in a verdict against the estate for $225,000. However, the assured's estate
was insolvent. Pursuant to an assignment, the plaintiff in the wrongful death action
pursued the assured's bad faith action against the insurer and defense counsel. The
insurer bought out for $89,000, but the malpractice and bad faith against Walcom
remained.
The appellate court determined that counsel was negligent as a matter of law and
remanded to the trial court on the question of causation. However, the court indicated
the obligation of good faith emanated from the general standard of professional care
and not the insurance contract. Id. at 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
With increased frequency, insurance defense counsel are being included as named de-
fendants in bad faith suits. See generally Brodsky, Duty of Attorney Appointed By
Liability Insurance Company, 14 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rv. 375 (1965); Hills, supra note 16,
at 34; Luvaas, Excess Judgments-Defense Counsel's Liability, 18 DEFENsE LJ. 259
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In enunciating this guide to reasonableness, the court tempered
the inherent conflict between the insurer's economic interests and
those of its assured by relegating to the insurer the arduous task of
preassessing the reasonableness of its treatment of the assured. Mis-
assessment could expose the insurer to liability for the entire adverse
judgment, even for amounts exceeding the policy limits.21 Since the
insurer is the only one who stands to benefit by litigation once a settle-
ment within the policy limits is offered, it is not unreasonable that
it should concomitantly suffer the entire loss should the case end in
an adverse judgment.
2
In attempting to define "reasonableness," however, the Comu-
nale court merely substituted one nebulous concept for another. The
court offered further elucidation nine years later in Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co.: 2
3
(1969); Panel-Conflicts of Interest Problems in Insurance Practice, 37 INs. COUNSEL
J. 497 (1970). See also Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 390 (1969) for a compendium of cases re-
garding malpractice of attorney in conflict of interest cases. Some jurisdictions have
taken the view that, in a conflict of interests situation, counsel's only client is the assured.
American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 393
(Sup. Ct. 1954), motion to withdraw appeal granted, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div.
1956). See also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 149 N.E.2d
482 (Ill. App. 1958).
21. 50 Cal. 2d at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-02. The court stated:
An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk, and, although its position
may not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be wrongful it
is liable for the full amount which will compensate the insured for all detriment
caused by the insurer's breach of the express and implied obligations of the con-
tract.
Id.
22. Cf. id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 202.
23. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). In Crisci, a tenant
in an apartment house owned by Mrs. Crisci fell through the staircase. The tenant
and her husband brought an action alleging negligent maintenance of the stairway.
The landlord had premises insurance of $10,000 for public liability. Suit was
brought for $400,000. Although liability was clear, there was some disagreement
as to the extent of the injury to the plaintiff wife. The wife had developed a psy-
chosis as a result of the accident, and plaintiffs' attorney had an expert psychiatrist who
would attest to this fact. The insurer had doctors who would, contrariwise, testify that
the plaintiff's mental state was not related to the accident. Both the insurer's trial
counsel and claims manager believed that, unless the medical experts of the insurance
company could prevail on the causation issue, a verdict of over $100,000.00 could be
expected.
Despite these considerations, Security refused an offer to settle for $9,000 which
included an offer to contribute $2,500 by the assured, Mrs. Crisci. Essentially, the
company gambled with their assured's financial future on the strength of their expert's
opinions. The case went to trial and resulted in a judgment for $100,000 to the
wife and $1,000 to her husband. Security, at the time of the trial, was left in
the embarrassing position of having a $3,000 offer to settle outstanding in the face
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In determining whether an insurer has given consideration to the interests
of the insured, the test is whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the settlement offer.2 4
Although the court based its finding of bad faith on established
case law, 5 the Crisci court strongly intimated that the insurer would
be liable for the entire amount of a final judgment in any case where
it rejected an offer to settle within the policy limits.2 6 In response
to the brief of an amicus curiae advancing that position, the court ob-
served that the rule proposed was "a simple one to apply" and in com-
port with principles of "elementary justice. 12 7  Indeed, the court sug-
gested that:
[A]n insurer should not be permitted to further its own interests by
rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits unless it is also
willing to absorb losses which may result from its failure to settle. 28
of a $101,000 judgment. The insurance company paid only $10,000, the maximum
coverage of the policy. Mrs. Crisci brought suit to recover the amount of the judgment
beyond the policy limits. In allowing the suit, the court concluded: "Liability is im-
posed not for a bad faith breach of the contract but for failure to meet the duty to
accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing." 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
In addition to the award of $91,000 (the difference between the $10,000 paid
by the insurer and the $101,000 judgment), the court sustained the jury's award of
$25,000 for mental suffering. It concluded that, although the action sounded in both
tort and contract, the plaintiff had the freedom to elect. Id. at 432-33, 426 P.2d at
178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18. The court commented: "The general rule of damages in tort
is that the injured party may recover for all detriment caused whether it could have
been anticipated or not." Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
The Crisci court impliedly sought to reconcile language in Comunale to the effect
that the bad faith of the insurer sounds in contract. Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 178, 56
Cal. Rptr. at 18. Comunale had emphasized the contractual nature of the cause of
action in order to gain the benefit of the longer statute of limitations applicable to
contract actions, in addition to supporting the assignability of the cause of action. 50
Cal. 2d at 663, 328 P.2d at 202-03. See also Snyder, supra note 5, at 10-11; Comment,
Approaching Strict Liability of Insurer For Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits,
47 NEB. L. REv. 705, 713-14 (1968).
The Crisci decision has been greeted with mixed reactions. Compare Snow, Excess
Liability-Crisci and Lysick, 36 INs. COUNSEL J. 51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Snow]
(wherein the author was critical of the strict liability language and mental suffering
recovery) with Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurers' Failure to Set-
tle: A Move Toward Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. Rlv. 799 (1968) and
Levit, The Crisci Case--Something Old, Something New, 2 U. SAN FRANcIsco L. REv.
1 (1967); 5 U. SAN DIEGo L. REv. 228 (1968).
24. 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See also Hills, supra note
16, at 52.
26. 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
27. Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
28. Id.
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And while the court noted that it need not "determine whether
there might be some countervailing considerations precluding adoption
of the proposed rule,"2 9 California courts were unlikely to disregard
these pointed and unanimous comments from the state's highest court.
One author commented on the aftermath of Crisci:
Clearly, howeVer, all recent bad faith cases have used an "after-the-
fact" approach in imposing liability on the insurer. . . . The "after-
the-fact" approach may indeed soon be denominated a form of strict
liability since it has long been established that no showing of negligence
on the part of the insurer is required. 30
II. THE FIRST PARTY CONTEXT 31
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co." is the leading California case
29. Id.
30. Hills, supra note 16, at 52 (footnote omitted).
31. The extension from the third party context to the first party suit is evident in
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
There the plaintiff, who did heavy manual labor for a rubber company, purchased a
disability policy which provided, among other things, for payments of $150.00 per
month for 30 years should the plaintiff become "totally disabled" because of injury.
Two years after the policy had been purchased, the plaintiff injured his back while
lifting at work. He was treated surgically for a hernia but continued to have back
trouble. This was later diagnosed as a herniated disc. A variety of physicians deemed
the plaintiff disabled. The plaintiff received disability payments from January, 1965
(immediately after the accident) through July, 1966 under the "sickness" provisions
of his policy when the payments were suddenly discontinued. Id. at 384-85, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 81-82.
Citing a report from one physician that the back trouble was related to a congenital
defect of the spine, the insurer demanded refund of the disability payments already
made minus the premiums paid. In later correspondence, the company offered to com-
promise the matter by dropping its demand for past payments in return for an immedi-
ate cancellation of the policy and a full release. At this point, the plaintiff sought legal
counsel, and a suit was filed.
The court concluded that the foregoing facts had
establish[ed] that defendants, without probable cause . . . . embarked upon a con-
certed course of conduct to induce plaintiff to surrender his insurance policy or
enter into a disadvantageous "settlement" of a nonexistent dispute by means of
false and threatening letters and the employment of economic pressure based upon
his disabled and therefore impecunious condition, (the very thing insured against)
exacerbated by Western National's malicious and bad faith refusal to pay plaintiff's
legitimate claim. Defendants concede that their conduct was "deplorable" and
"outrageous."
Id. at 392, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
There was additional evidence that the insurer's conduct had caused the plaintiff to
lose property in Arizona, made him frequently delinquent on his house payments,
forced his wife to go to work, required his daughter to lose two months of school in
order to stay home and care for him and the small children, and had his utilities
shut off on several occasions. Id. at 393-94, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
The Fletqher court, analogizing to Onsci and other bad faith cases in a third party
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exemplifying the nature of the bad faith cause of action in the first
party context. Gruenberg was the owner of a bar and cocktail lounge
context, suggested that because of the contractual context, a special relationship existed
between an insurer and its assured, obligating an insurer to protect the assured's inter-
ests even though, objectively speaking, it might not be good business. Id. at 403-04,
89 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95. While comparing the duty of a liability insurer and disability
insurer the court stated:
Included within this duty [of good faith and fair dealing] in the case of a liability
insurance policy is the duty to act reasonably and in good faith to settle claims
against the insured by a third person. . . . We think that, similarly, the implied-
in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty
not to threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously and without
probable cause ....
Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (citations omitted). However, the real significance
of the case in the insurance field lies in the fact that it upheld the jury's award of
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, including punitive damages.
See id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. The court, in upholding the award, made
reference to the disparity in the bargaining positions inherent in disability policies. Id.
at 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95. Because of the insurer's dominant position, and the
fact that the disability insurance is procured to give assureds "peace of mind and secu-
rity," assureds are peculiarly "vulnerable" to oppressive tactics by the insurer. These
factors combine to make the assured acutely susceptible to the tort of intentional inflic-
tional of emotional distress. Id. at 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
It has been suggested that the insurer-insured relationship is such that an insurance
company is continually exposed to causes of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress because of (1) the position of power the insurer has over an insured
who has suffered a casualty of some sort; (2) the insurer is peculiarly aware of his
dominant position and the assured's susceptibility; and (3) the presence of a special
duty. Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the Tort of The Intentional Infliction of
Mental Distress: Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 39 INs. COUNsEL
J. 335, 337-40, 342 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Keenan].
The Fletcher standard of good faith, regarding the payment of policy benefits in a
non-third party context, was soon after adopted in Richardson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) wherein an insurer,
under an uninsured motorist policy, withheld payment on a clearly valid claim for over
one year. Id. at 239, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 552. The court citing Fletcher and Comunale
stated:
In every insurance policy there is implied by law a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. This implied obligation requires an insurer to deal in good faith and
fairly with its insured in handling an insured's claim against it. Here, Employers
deliberately, willfully and in bad faith withheld payment of the Richardson claim
months after it knew the claim to be completely valid; it forced an arbitration
hearing on a claim against which it already knew that it had no defense; even after
the award was made, it instructed its local office to attempt "to make the best
possible settlement," and forced plaintiffs to resort to litigation to have the award
judicially confirmed. This conduct toward its own insured was unconscionable,
and constituted a torious breach of contract.
Id. (citations omitted). Note that this case was retried due to the trial court's failure
to declare a mistrial when plaintiff's counsel exposed a prejudicial newspaper headline
to the jury. The court also took the position that there was insufficient evidence for
a jury instruction on emotional distress. In applying the good faith standard, the court
upheld the granting of punitive damages. It concluded:
The fact that the conduct constituting the tort also involves the breach of a cove-
nant, implied by law -in the insurance policy, does not prevent the recovery of
punitive damages under section 3294 by the insured from the insurer.
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in Los Angeles. He had insured the premises with three insurance
carriers for an aggregate of $35,000.38 After a fire substantially de-
stroyed the premises, Gruenberg was arrested and charged with ar-
son34 and defrauding an insurer.3 5  There was some evidence that
Gruenberg had obtained excessive insurance coverage on the prem-
ises .3  As is common to most fire policies, Gruenberg was required
to submit to an examination under oath. He refused, citing the pend-
ing criminal charges. The insurers' counsel rejected Gruenberg's at-
torney's suggestion that the exam be continued until after the prelim-
inary hearing on the criminal charges. When Gruenberg failed to ap-
pear, the insurers' counsel, by letter, denied liability on behalf of the
insurers, citing Gruenberg's "failure to submit to the exam under oath
and to produce documents.
'37
Later, the charges against Gruenberg were dropped for want of
probable cause; nevertheless, the insurers refused Gruenberg's offer
to submit to an exam and continued to abide by their position that
there was no coverage.3
8
The supreme court, recognizing that the great body of bad faith
precedents involved excess judgments in a third party context, sought to
bridge the gap between these two branches of bad faith. It stated:
These are merely two different aspects of the same duty. That re-
sponsibility is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the policy
itself-to defend, settle, or pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be
imposed by the law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in
Id. at 245, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 556 (emphasis in original). CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294
(West 1970) provides as follows:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
See also Note, Contracting For Punitive Damages: Fletcher v. Western National Life
Insurance Company, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 208 (1971).
32. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
33. Id. at 570, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
34. Id. The arson charge was made under CAL. PENAL CODE § 448a (West 1970).
35. 9 Cal. 3d at 570, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 548 (West 1970) provides:
Every person who willfully bums or in any other manner injures, destroys, se-
cretes, abandons, or disposes of any property which at the time is insured against
loss or damage by fire, or theft, or embezzlement, or any casualty with intent to
defraud or prejudice the insurer, whether the same be the property or in the pos-
session of such person or any other person, is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for not less than one year and not more than 10 years.
36. 9 Cal. 3d at 570, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
37. Id. at 571, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
38. Id. at 570-71, 510 P.2d at 1034-35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
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good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities. Where in so
doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured by refus-
ing, without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered
by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.39
Defense counsel took the position in Gruenberg that the plain-
tiff's failure to appear at the scheduled examination under oath on
December 12, 1969, amounted to a breach of the plaintiff's obligation
under the fire policy, thereby relieving the insurer of its concomitant
duty of good faith and fair dealing.40 In response, the court deline-
ated what is undoubtedly the ultimate extension of a good faith obliga-
tion in the non-third party area:
While it might be argued that defendants would be excused from their
contractual duties (e.g., obligation to indemnify) if plaintiff breached
his obligations under the policies, we do not think that plaintiff's alleged
breach excuses defendants from their duty, implied by law, of good
faith and fair dealing. In other words, the insurer's duty is uncondi-
tional and independent of performance of the plaintiff's contractual
obligations.4
1
The court also concluded that "the duty of good faith and fair
dealing on the part of the defendant insurance companies is an abso-
lute one."
42
Thus, a post-loss breach of the insurance contract terms would not
relieve the insurer of the overriding duty of good faith; albeit,
the insurer could in appropriate circumstances still deny liability and
ultimately refuse to indemnify. Consequently, the thrust of the deci-
sion is aimed at regulating an insurer's behavior when the facts attend-
ant to a loss suggest a real possibility of no coverage under the policy
terms. The court rather obliquely implies that, given the insurer's
understandable belief that arson had been committed, it nevertheless
had an obligation to continue its "good faith" conduct, mindful of the
assured's possible economic and emotional vulnerability.43  In Gruen-
39. Id. at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
40. Id. at 576-77, 510 P.2d at 1039, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 487. The insurer contended
that the plaintiff's appearance at the examination was a condition precedent to any
action on the assured's part toward recovery under the policy.
41. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Gruenberg alleged: "As a 'direct and proximate result of the outrageous conduct
and bad faith of the defendants,' plaintiff suffered 'severe economic damages,' 'severe
emotional upset and distress,' loss of earnings and various special damages." 9 Cal.
3d at 572, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The court stated the general
rule to be: "[A] plaintiff who as a result of a defendant's tortious conduct loses
1974]
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berg, the insurers were required to give the assured the benefit of the
doubt regarding the pending criminal charges. Moreover, the decision
implies that the insurer must act in good faith even when confronted with
an assured's flagrant post-loss non-cooperation. Finally, the decision
required the insurers at least to accommodate Gruenberg by providing
an alternative date for the examination under oath that would not con-
flict with the pending criminal proceedings and to refrain from affirma-
tive conduct calculated to produce a coverage defense.
Despite extensive litigation, the courts have yet to lucidly define
the basis for the bad faith cause of action. Instead, the law in this
area has developed on a piecemeal basis. In characterizing conduct
as exhibiting bad faith, the courts generally have tested the facts in
each case with three questions. First, would the insurer have settled
had the policy limits been unlimited?44 Second, did the insurer give
as much consideration to the assured's interests as it did its own?"
And finally, did the insurer keep the assured apprised of the negotia-
tions regarding settlement?48
his property and suffers mental distress may recover not only for pecuniary loss but
also for mental distress." Id. at 579, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (empha-
sis in original). While recognizing that the insurer's conduct caused substantial eco-
nomic loss apart from mental distress, it concluded that "the complaint is sufficiently
pleaded with respect to the latter element of damages" thus allowing damages for emo-
tional distress. Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
The result is that an insurer, in pre-assessing its own conduct toward its assured,
must weigh the assured's economic and emotional vulnerability since its conduct may
cause economic damage to the assured which in turn may give rise to damages for
emotional distress.
44. Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1965). The assured in that case rear-ended a vehicle causing the death of two people
and personal injury to three others. The assured possessed liability coverage of
$20,000. The company set its policy reserves for the two deaths at a total of
$4,500, and for the personal injuries at $11,500. These reserves were never
changed. The plaintiff offered to settle on two occasions for $9,500. Both offers
were refused. The insurance defense counsel wrote to the company and advised that
in his opinion, the company should accept the offer and concluded that "if judgment
were awarded, it could very well exceed the policy limit." At trial, the plaintiff made
a third and final offer of $8,000, and the company responded with a counter offer
of $7,500. A verdict of $30,000 was returned against the assured. See also Davy
v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960) (The plaintiff
in a personal injury action made demand for the $5,000 policy limit, and the
insurer counter offered $4,500. Naturally, the injury brought in an excess verdict).
45. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201
(1958); Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140, 146
(1958).
46. Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1965). There, the court commented:
The lawyer, although selected by the company, was the lawyer for the insured
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In light of the fact that the Gruenberg court bridged the gap be-
tween the first and third party bad faith suits, a corollary has been
added to these considerations. The court will also analyze the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the case to determine if the insurer
dealt fairly with the assured and took into account his economic and
emotional vulnerability.
47
It is evident that if "bad faith" is extended to the primary-excess
insurance relationship, the first three considerations would be easily
adaptable as determinations of a bad faith violation, but the underlying
policy reasons for -adding the Gruenberg corollary in the first and third
party context may be missing in the primary-excess context. Unlike
the first and third party relationship, wherein economic and emotional
vulnerability may be extreme, in the primary-excess context the vul-
nerability is one which the excess carrier has received premiums to
accept. Although this element is a factor that courts will consider
in determining if a bad faith violation has occurred in situations where
it is already established that the good faith requirement exists, in the
primary-excess context it may serve as a means to defeat the adoption
of a duty of good faith in the first place.
111. ExcEss V. PRIMARY INSURERS
The primary-excess relationship may be formed in either of two
ways. First, an individual may purchase two insurance policies, desig-
nating from the outset which provides primary and which provides ex-
cess coverage.48  Or, secondly, an assured may purchase but one pol-
as well. He was also engaged by the company to defend the other claims arising
from the accident, and, presumably, had knowledge of the entire factual situation.
Scoggins [the insured] was the client and had a right to have information, protec-
tion, guidance and advice from the lawyer. His interests should not have been
determined by the judgment of the claims manager, which, unknown to him, was
at varianxce with that of the lawyer.
Id. at 901, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398. See also Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140, 146 (1958); cf. Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215
Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1963). In addition, there are other factors enter-
ing into the court's determination of bad faith. In Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14
Cal. App. 3d 433, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1971), the court reasoned that the insurer was
not guilty of bad faith failure to settle where the facts indicated that the insured-dece-
dent's estate had left no assets that could be subject to an excess liability from the
judgment. In Garner v. American Mut. Liberty Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107
Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973), the court's finding of bad faith appeared to hinge on the fact
that the insurer had relinquished its obligation to make a full and independent investi-
gation of all factors relevant in determining potential liability.
47. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
48. This type of coverage is more common among the rather large, sophisticated cli-
ents who are exposed to substantial liability. In fact, many of these clients will remain
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icy which provides that it shall apply as excess insurance over any
other similar insurance that is available on a primary basis.49  There
is no contractual relationship between the primary and excess insur-
ance carriers in either of these situations; their only link lies with the
common assured.
Although there may be variations, generally the primary insurer is
usually responsible for the defense and/or settlement of the lawsuit,
as well as the duty to indemnify up to a designated amount. The
excess insurer's only obligation is to indemnify above the limits of
the primary insurer's coverage. In effect, the excess carrier provides
"umbrella" coverage against the larger losses that the assured may suf-
fer.
uninsured or self-insured up to a designated amount with umbrella covereage for any-
thing above this figure. Generally, this is because the incidence of small claims are
so high that full coverage premiums would be prohibitive.
49. A typical example of this situation is that of an assured operating a "non-owned"
vehicle at the time of the accident. As a general rule, the insurer of the automobile
is deemed the primary insurer, and the driver's automobile insurer is deemed the excess
carrier. Unlike the normal excess-primary relationship, these carriers are linked to
the assured nonconsensually, i.e., merely by the fortuitous collision.
The type of insurance provision governing this situation where two policies apply
to a single loss is called an "other insurance" clause. The "Travelers Personal Au-
tomobile Policy," Policy Forms 100, 102, and LP (2d ed.); Policy Forms 101, at 8 pro-
vision reads:
If the insured has other insurance against any damages or loss covered by Part
I [liability portion] of this policy the company shall not be liable under this pol-
icy for a greater proportion of such damages or loss than the applicable limit of
liability stated in the declarations bears to the total applicable limit of liability
of all valid and collectible insurance against such damages or loss ...
This type of "other insurance" clause is known as a "proration" clause, because if both
policies apply, the insurers pay in the proportion their respective policy limits bear to
the loss. A true excess policy will provide:
mhe insurance ...shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar
insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary
insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the
limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance.
Id. However, the insurer must be careful not to word the "other insurance" clause
so as to constitute an "escape" provision, i.e., where the other insurer is able to avoid
payment altogether by virtue of the policy terms. "Escape" clauses are not favored
by the court and should the court so construe the clause, that insurer will be deemed
primary. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
273 Cal. App. 2d 445, 78 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1969); Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956); Air Transp. Mfg. v. Employers'
Liab. Assurance Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949).
Nevertheless a line of cases holds that where there are multiple insurance policies
covering the same loss, one with a proration clause and the other naming itself as an
excess policy, the policy with the proration clause will be treated as the primary policy.
iee, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 318, 419 P.2d
641, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
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As with bad faith cases in the third-party context,50 the problems
between primary and excess insurers involve conflicting interests. For
example, if a lawsuit involving significant injuries and borderline liabil-
ity has been filed against a common assured, the primary insurer with
low policy limits may be disposed to pursue a trial on the liability ques-
tion rather than settle within the policy limits. Simply stated, the pri-
mary insurer gambles with the excess insurer's funds in the hope of
successfully defending the action.
A conflict of interest can also be manifested in the situation where
a trial has ended in an adverse judgment above the primary insurer's
policy limits and within the excess insurer's coverage. The primary
insurer then either moves for a new trial or files an appeal, and the
plaintiff's attorney offers to settle the matter for less than the jury's
award if the insurer will forego the new trial or appeal. Since the
primary insurer is likely to save little, if anything, on the settlement,
it may be persuaded to take its chances on a new trial or appeal to
the detriment of the excess insurer.
Situations such as these focus the attention of the insurer on the
critical need for a judicial definition of the duties, if any, existing be-
tween the two insurance carriers. Is this simply a risk the excess car-
rier has assumed in avoiding the expense of defending the assured,
or is there inherent in the relationship between excess and primary
carriers a basic obligation of fairness? If there is a basic obligation
of fairness, is it an absolute one as outlined in the first-party context
arising from a contractual basis,51 or is it an independent duty imposed
from some other basis? Lastly, if a duty of fairness does exist, is
a breach of that duty determined by the strict liability of the three-
prong test52 as amended by the consideration of the assured's eco-
nomic and emotional vulnerability53 in the first party context? For
the most part, these questions have not been answered in California.
The application of a duty of good faith in the excess-primary rela-
tionship was unsuccessfully attempted in Universal Underwriters Insur-
ance Co. v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Co.,54 and Rocky Mountain
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Dairyland Insurance Co.55 These two cases,
applying Arizona law, illustrate the problems that California courts must
consider.
50. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
52. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
53. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
54. 433 P.2d 966 (Ariz. 1967).
55. 452 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1971).
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In Universal, a vehicle owned by one Meyer was involved in an
automobile accident while being driven by a garage employee. The
garage-keeper's policy with Universal was deemed excess, and Meyer's
$10,000 policy with Dairyland was deemed primary5O When Dairy-
land refused to defend a lawsuit filed against its insured, Universal
provided a defense and subsequently settled the matter for $30,000.7
Universal then brought an action to recover the judgment plus attor-
neys' fees and costs. It argued that Dairyland's refusal to defend and
indemnify constituted bad faith and, therefore, required the primary
insurer to be liable for the entire judgment, even though it exceeded
its own policy limits.5 8 Although Universal was granted a contribution
from Dairyland of $10,000, the court rejected its cause of action for
bad faith:
Without doubt Dairyland owed good faith to its insured, which may
or may not haVe been here exercised, a question we find unnecessary
to answer. There is no [privity] of contract between these two insur-
ance companies nor is there any principle of law which we are aware
that would give Universal such a windfall because of Dairyland's mis-
treatment of its assured. The principle applicable is that, where two
companies insure the same risk and one is compelled to pay the loss,
it is entitled to a contribution from the other.50
An identical conclusion was reached in Rocky Mountain. There,
Rocky Mountain was the excess carrier and Dairyland, the primary
carrier, defended. An excess judgment resulted.Y0 Dairyland then
moved for a new trial, and the plaintiff responded with an offer to
settle below the jury award, but still in excess of Dairyland's primary
limits.61 Rocky Mountain urged Dairyland to accept the offer, and
even offered to contribute to the settlement above Dairyland's limits.0
2
Dairyland refused, and a new trial resulted in a verdict larger than
the first.
63
Rocky Mountain alleged that:
(1) Dairyland owed a duty of good faith to the excess insurer and
breached that duty by refusing to offer to pay its policy limits in settle-
56. 433 P.2d at 968.
57. Id. at 967.
58. Id. at 968.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. 452 F.2d at 603.
61. Id.
62. id.
03. 14,
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ment, and (2) Rocky Mountain, as subrogee of . . . [the assured's]
rights, can recover for Dairyland's alleged breach of its duty to . . .
[the assured] to negotiate in good faith.
4
The court, relying solely on Universal, summarily rejected both bases
of the complaint.
Universal and Rocky Mountain demonstrated three significant ques-
tions an excess carrier seeking reimbursement from a primary carrier
must consider: privity of contract; the doctrine of subrogation; and
a direct duty of good faith between the two insurers. Ultimately, the
success of these legal avenues, as a means by which the excess carrier
can sue on a bad faith cause of action, will depend on whether or
not the California courts conclude that the existence of such a remedy
for excess carriers is in furtherance of some public policy.
A. Privity of Contract
It is clear that the bad faith cause of action arises out of the creation
of a contract. As the court indicated in Comunale, "There is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other
to receive the benefits of the agreement." 65  Ostensibly, no privity
exists between the primary and excess insurers since they both deal
independently with the assured.
Two California cases, Lysick v. Walcom66 and Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co.,67 have examined the question of bad faith in conjunc-
tion with contractual privity. In Lysick, the plaintiff argued that the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing ran in favor of the assured
from defense counsel, as well as from the carrier. The court re-
sponded:
It is apparent that the foregoing rule [of good faith] is one that applies
to the insurance company and the insured, and not to the attorney for
either of them, since it finds its genesis in the contractual relationship
between the insurer and the insured which gives rise to the implied
covenant imposing the duty described by the rule.
6 8
64. 452 F.2d at 603 (9th Cir. 19"71) (emphasis added). The trial jury award was
for $12,500. Plaintiff offered to settle for $12,000, and Rocky Mountain offered
to contribute $2,000 toward the demand if Dairyland would drop its motion for a
new trial. A new trial was granted and it ended with a jury award of $21,500.
Id.
65. 50 Cal. 2d at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
66. 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968).
67. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
68. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
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Instead, the court concluded that the attorney's standard of conduct
is prescribed by "established standards of professional ethics.""0
The same point was emphasized in Gruenberg. In that case the
insured alleged, inter alia, a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealingY° He named as defendants the three insurance
companies who insured the destroyed building, the insurance adjuster
and adjusting firm, and the insurance defense firm, including one of its
attorneys. While upholding the validity of the complaint as to the
insurance companies, the California Supreme Court perfunctorily dis-
missed the complaint as to the other named defendants:
[S]ince the remaining defendants were not subject to the implied
duty arising from the contractual relationship, we conclude that the
complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action
against them .... 71
Although not dealing with the primary-excess relationship directly,
it is evident that California courts are reluctant to apply the bad faith
concept in the absence of privity. Consequently, if California courts
are to recognize bad faith in the primary-excess context, they are likely
to rely on concepts other than those arising from the contractual agree-
ment.
B. Equitable Subrogation
The general rule of equitable subrogation is that "an insurer, on
paying a loss, is subrogated in a corresponding amount to the insured's
right of action against any other person responsible for the loss. ' '72
Only a few bad faith cases have dealt with this issue. Significant
among these is a New York case, Home Insurance Co. v. Royal In-
demnity Co.73  There, the underlying personal injury action resulted
in a verdict of $1,250,000. Royal, the primary insurance carrier, had
policy limits of $500,000, while Home assumed the risk for every-
thing from $500,000 to $1,500,000. While an appeal was pending,
plaintiff's counsel offered to settle for $700,000 and then $900,000.
69. Id.
70. 9 Cal. 3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1036, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
71. Id. at 581, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
72. 6A APPLumAN, supra note 11, § 4051, at 103 (footnote omitted). The doctrine
of subrogation does not arise from the terms of the contract. Instead,
[i]t has its origin in general principles of equity, and the nature of the contract
of insurance. In fact it would be applied or not according to the dictates of equity
and good conscience, and considerations of public policy, resting as it does, upon
the maxim that no one should be enriched by another's loss.
Id. (citation omitted).
73. 327 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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Home, understandably disturbed by the high trial court judgment, had
already communicated to Royal that it would seek indemnity for any-
thing that it would be forced to pay.74 The primary insurer rejected
the plaintiffs settlement offer. Eventually, the appeal reduced the
award to $749,111.53, with Home contributing $200,000. There-
after, Home brought an action to recover its contribution, alleging that
Royal had "acted negligently and in bad faith" in refusing to accept
an offer of settlement within its policy limits. 7 Royal counterclaimed,
asserting that Home's refusal to cooperate with the post-trial settlement
arrangement was in bad faith. The court concluded:
Home, once it paid so much of . . . [the assured's] obligation under
the judgment as it was required to do by its insurance contract,
became the equitable assignee or subrogee of . . . [the assured's]
rights with respect thereto. In this case, vis-a-vis Royal, it is an insured
-not an insurer-and its rights and obligations must be viewed in that
context. Just as Royal owed Home the duty of negotiating in good
faith so Home owed Royal the contractual duty of cooperation and
the common law duty to mitigate damages. 76
Thus, without discussion, the Home court applied the concept of equi-
table subrogation to the benefit of an excess insurance carrier.
As the court described it, equitable subrogation allows the insurer
to stand in the shoes of its assured and assume whatever rights or
obligations the assured may have had. 77 The subrogating insurer's
74. Id. at 747. The basis for Home's claim was failure to settle within the policy
limits and negligence in defense.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 748 (citations omitted). While the court mentioned both equitable subro-
gation and equitable assignment, other courts have indicated that there is little differ-
ence between the two concepts:
While subrogation and assignment have certain technical differences, each oper-
ates to transfer from one person to another a cause of action against a third, and
the reasons of policy which make certain causes of action nonassignable would
seem to operate as forcefully against the transfer of such causes of action by sub-
rogation.
Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 640, 354 P.2d 1073, 1078, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377,
382 (1960). Regardless of the label, the ultimate effect is to pass title to a cause
of action to another person. See 6A APPLEMAN, supra note 11, § 4054, at 142.46.
77. 327 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The barriers to subrogation are public policy, equitable
principles, and statutory construction. See American Ins. Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
187 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Wis. 1971).
One author commented:
The origin and basis of subrogation is stated to be in the nature of things; that
is, it grows out of natural justice demanded by the facts of the situation. Subroga-
tion was judicially stated to be merely the doctrine of the square deal, it is en-
forced only in favor of a superior equity, and it is for the equity court to say
who, in good conscience, should bear the loss. The doctrine is not regarded as
an inflexible legal concept, but is simply an exercise of equitable power carried
out in the exercise of proper equitable discretion, with a due regard for the legal
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(subrogee) rights are strictly limited to those rights possessed by the
assured (subrogor).78 Subrogation is permitted in order to shift the
loss to the real wrongdoer. 79 Additionally, it is designed to prevent
the assured from procuring double recovery against the tort-feasor and
insurers.8 ° Generally, subrogation is only allowed in forms of indem-
nity insurance, i.e., when the assured's loss is liquidated.8'
The doctrine of equitable subrogation can only be effective if used
in conjunction with the Collateral Source Rule, a rule that denies the
wrongdoer credit for reparation made to the injured party from sources
other than the wrongdoer.82  For example, if an assured's home burns
down, he is reimbursed by his premises' insurer. The insurer then
subrogates to the assured's cause of action against the individual re-
sponsible for the loss. However, because of the Collateral Source
Rule, the responsible party cannot assert as a defense the fact that
the assured has already been compensated for the loss by the assured's
insurance coverage and is, therefore, not damaged. Without the ap-
plication of the Collateral Source Rule, the insurer's subrogation rights
would be useless.
As to the propriety of the subrogation remedy in California, two
important cases have rigidly confined the circumstances in which sub-
rogation will be countenanced. 83 The first of these cases was Patent
and equitable rights of others.
11 APPLEMAN, supra note 11, § 6502, at 294 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Federal
Ins. Co. v. Allen, 13 Cal. App. 3d 648, 650, 92 Cal. Rptr. 125, 126 (1970); Agricul-
tural Ins. Co. v. Smith, 262 Cal. App. 2d 772, 777-78, 69 Cal. Rptr. 50, 54 (1968);
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 369, 376, 343
P.2d 658, 662 (1959).
78. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1478 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fleming]. See R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN IN-
sURANcE THEoRY AND PRACTlCE (1964); Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insur-
ance Subrogation, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 841 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kimball].
79. Fleming, supra note 78, at 1483.
80. Id.
81. Kimball, supra note 78, at 844-48. See, e.g., Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal.
2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960); Block v. California Physicians' Serv.,
244 Cal. App. 2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1966); Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963) (wherein a medical payments subroga-
tion claim was voided); KEnTON, supra note 18, at 147-53; 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 668,
672 (1961).
82. For a discussion of the Collateral Source Rule, see Maxwell, The Collateral
Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1962);
Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REv. 349 (1961).
83. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Hustel, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1065, 89 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1970); Patent Scaffolding v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 506,
64 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1967).
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Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Construction Co.8 4 Simpson,
a general contractor, contracted with the California Institute of Tech-
nology to construct a building. Simpson then contracted with Pat-
ent Scaffolding, a sub-contractor, to furnish scaffolding and other
equipment. The contract between Simpson and Patent Scaffolding
provided that the general contractor would procure insurance pro-
tecting Patent Scaffolding's equipment without cost to Patent Scaf-
folding. A fire destroyed certain equipment of Patent Scaffold-
ing's, and their insurers were forced to indemnify. Patent Scaffold-
ing's insurer then proceeded by way of equitable subrogation in an
attempt to recover from Simpson on the theory that Simpson had
breached its promise to provide insurance.8 They contended that
having indemnified Patent Scaffolding for the fire loss, they were sub-
rogated to Patent Scaffolding's right of action for breach of a contract
to provide insurance against Simpson.86 The court reasoned that an
insurer's loss cannot be substituted for an assured's loss -if the insur-
er's loss was not proximately caused by Simpson's act or omission.8 7
The court concluded:
The insurers' loss was not caused by Simpson's failure to get insurance
or to indemnify Patent. The insurers' loss was caused by the fire, the
very risk which each assumed, and Simspson's [sic] failure to perform
its contractual duty had nothing to do with the fire.88
In addition, the court held that the subrogating insurer could not
claim the benefit of the Collateral Source Rule in meeting the defend-
ant's contention that the assured (subrogor) had not, in fact, been
damaged,8 9 concluding that the application of the Collateral Source Rule
would be inappropriate because again the loss had been occasioned
not by the breach of the contract, but by the fire itself.90
By analogy, in the excess-primary context, the primary carrier might
take the position that the assured has, in fact, not been damaged, since
the judgment above the primary policy limits was covered within the
excess carrier's policy limits. The subrogating excess carrier might
then claim that the Collateral Source Rule prevented the primary car-
rier from raising the pre-existence of compensation. The primary car-
84. 256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1967).
85. Id. at 507-09, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 189-91.
86. Id. at 511, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 512, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
89. Id. at 514, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 193. For a discussion of the Collateral Source
Rule, see note 82 supra and accompanying text.
90. 256 Cal. App. 2d at 514, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
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rier, relying on Patent Scaffolding, could counter by arguing that the
application of the Collateral Source Rule would be inappropriate to
the situation, for the proximate cause of the loss would not be the
primary carrier, but the negligent assured.
Basically, Patent Scaffolding recognizes that (aside from subroga-
tion designed to properly place the burden for the underlying loss on
the party at fault) no public policy is served by shifting losses between
insurers. 91 In the primary versus excess insurer context, the assured's
cause of action for bad faith against the primary carrier is just a fiction
to provide a vehicle for subrogation, since the assured has suffered
no real loss. Patent Scaffolding suggests that in cases where the insur-
ers have been required to pay for a risk compensated by premiums,
the denial of subrogation prevents an insurer from receiving a wind-
fall.9 2
A similar conclusion was reached in Mid-Century Insurance Co. v.
Hutsel.93 There, an insurance agent negligently failed to procure an
insurance renewal for his client's automobile. The vehicle was being
used by the owner's step-son with the permission of the owner when
an accident occurred. The permissive user was insured with Mid-
Century Insurance. Mid-Century sought reimbursement through the
doctrine of equitable subrogation. 94  The court, relying on Patent
Scaffolding, rejected this approach, stating: "Any loss Mid-Century may
sustain will not be caused by Hutsel's [the agent's] failure to procure in-
surance . . . [but because] Leakes, its insured, negligently caused an
automobile accident."95
Subrogation by insurers has been traditionally allowed only in re-
spect to property and indemnity insurance policies. It is not entirely
clear why subrogation is thus limited to the exclusion of other types
of insurance. Suffice it to say that subrogation is a peculiar equitable
creature and that some compelling public policy rationale will be re-
quired before the California courts will allow an excess carrier to sub-
rogate against a primary carrier. For example, a strong case could
be asserted for allowing subrogation if the insurer could demonstrate
that recoveries by virtue of subrogation had entered into the premium
calculations, but there is little evidence that subrogation has a serious
impact on premium schedules. One writer in the field commented:
91. Id. at 515-16, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
92. Id.
93. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1065, 89 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970).
94. Id. at 1070, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
95. Id.
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"Subrogation is a windfall to the insurer. It plays no part in rate
schedule or only a minor one; and no reduction is made in insuring
interests."'9 6
In Comunale and Brown, the courts recognized the validity of the
assured's assignment of his cause of action for bad faith to the judg-
ment creditor.97  Obviously, the assignment vehicle could be equally
applicable in the excess-primary context, but the propriety of either
legal vehicle (equitable subrogation or assignment) depends upon
whether the assured possesses a cause of action for bad faith to begin
with. In both instances, the subrogating carrier or assignee is strictly
limited to the rights possessed by the assured and can only pursue
a bad faith cause of action if the assured has one.
In Home,9 8 the assured suffered no real damage by the primary
carrier's failure to settle within the policy limits since it possessed ex-
cess coverage with Home. Home accepted without comment the du-
bious conclusion that an assured has a cause of action for bad faith
against a primary carrier even though the assured's personal assets are
not threatened. 9
There is some support in California for the position that where the
assured's personal assets are not threatened by the insurer's conduct,
there is no bad faith cause of action.100 Shapero v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 10 presented a unique situation where the deceased assured,
defendant to a bodily injury action, left an estate with no assets other
than a liability insurance policy. Although there was no demand to
settle within the policy limits, the case was tried and resulted in an
excess verdict. The estate then assigned its cause of action for bad
faith to the judgment creditor. All parties were cognizant that the
defendant's estate was judgment-proof.
In deciding that the estate's insurer was not guilty of bad faith, the
court commented:
Allstate could not be found guilty of bad faith for acdepting as a work-
ing hypothesis the fact which was also assumed by the personal repre-
sentative of its assured-that the estate had no interest, no financial
96. E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1957).
97. 50 Cal. 2d at 661-62, 328 P.2d at 202 (assignment by judgment creditor); 155
Cal. App. 2d at 692-96, 319 P.2d at 77-79 (assignment by trustee in bankruptcy).
98. See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
99. 327 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
100. Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 438, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247-
48 (1971).
101. Id.
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stake in the outcome of the litigation, and no assets which would be
exposed to risk by a failure of Allstate to settle.
10 2
In sum, the court concluded that an insurer, in considering settle-
ment, must weigh the competing interests of the insurance company
and the assured; and, that in the instant case, "there was no breach
of the implied covenant because there was no interest to be dam-
aged.' 1 0 3  But the court mentioned that cases where the assured was
"alive" with no assets were distinguishable, since the insurer must con-
sider the assured's interest and his "future solvency and credit stand-
ing."'
104
In addition, in Merritt v. Reserve Insurance Co.'05 the court acknowl-
edged that when an insurer is evaluating a settlement offer, "the car-
rier is theoretically required to assume that its assured can respond
in damages to the full amount of the claim."'10 Nonetheless, the court
stated that the financial status of the assured was a "critical element"
and that "in each instance the carrier is required to give serious and
careful consideration to the true position and interests of its assured.'
1
1
0 7
In any event, whether the assured is alive or dead, if there is excess
insurance involved, in reality the assured's financial interests are not
endangered, and there is, in effect, no conflict presented to the carrier.
Absent an endangered interest, no bad faith cause of action attaches,
and there is nothing to which the excess carrier can be subrogated.
C. Direct Duty
It is conceivable that the California courts could dictate a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing between excess and primary insurers
notwithstanding lack of privity and independent of the equitable subro-
gation theory. There are cases which have done this; however, to
date all of them have come from the Tenth Circuit.
In St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Martin,08 a declaratory relief
102. Id. at 438, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
103. Id. at 439, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
104. Id. at 438 n.1, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 248 n.1.
105. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
106. Id. at 874, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 522, citing Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co.,
231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1965).
107. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (emphasis added).
108. 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951). Also in American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951) the Tenth Circuit clearly
indicated that an excess carrier was entitled to equitable subrogation to the assured's bad
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action was brought by a primary insurer against an excess insurer to de-
termine whether or not an excess insurer can force a primary insurer to
pay its entire policy limits in settlement of a lawsuit involving question-
able liability. The court, in concluding that an excess carrier could
not, stated, in dictum:
As the primary insurer, St. Paul was required under its relationship
to its insured and the excess insurer, to 'exercise good faith in determin-
ing whether an offer of compromise of settlement should be accepted
or rejected.10 9
The court's dictum plainly states that a duty of good faith exists
between primary and excess carriers. The court's rationale for this
position is not explicitly enunciated, but further in the opinion the
court makes an observation which provides a clue: "If [the primary
insurer] acts in good faith and without negligence in refusing the prof-
fered settlement, it has fulfilled its duty to its insured, and those in privity
with it. 11 0
This language suggests that the duty of good faith is somehow
linked with contractual privity (a position accepted by the California
courts),' but the court does not explain how it was able to find priv-
ity between the carriers.
The only case to openly recognize that a duty of due care and good
faith exists, despite the patent lack of privity, is United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. Tri-State Insurance Co."2 In dictum," 3 the court
faith cause of action against the primary carrier. Id. at 238. In an earlier trial,
Security, the excess carrier, pursuant to its subrogation clause, had requested the
assured to assert a bad faith action against American Fidelity, the excess carrier, for
failure to settle within the policy limits. The holding only involved peripherally the
equitable subrogation concept, dealing in the main with the propriety of Security's
substitution in the action. Nonetheless, ostensibly, the case supports the use of
equitable subrogation by the excess carrier.
109. 190 F.2d at 457. See generally Bloom, Recovery Against Primary Insurer By Ex-
cess Carrier For Bad Faith or Negligent Failure to Settle, 36 INS. CoUNsE. J. 235,
237 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bloom]; and Knepper, Relationships Between Pri-
mary and Excess Carriers in Cases Where Judgment or Settlement Value Will Exhaust
the Primary Coverage, 20 INs. COUNSEL J. 207 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Knepper].
110. 190 F.2d at 458.
111. See notes 65-71 supra and accompanying text.
112. 285 F.2d at 579 (10th Cir. 1960).
113. The court in this case felt that the excess carrier was not entitled to contribu-
tion from the primary insurer for expenses incurred in the successful defense of a third-
party action, although the primary carrier had breached its obligation to defend. The
court concluded: "The duty to defend is personal to each insurer. The obligation is
several and the carrier is not entitled to divide the duty nor require contribution from
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commented:
The obligation to the excess carrier is not contractual and is based only
upon the duty of the primary carrier to perform the obligation which
it alone has assumed, that is, provide primary coverage. 114
The court concluded that the primary carrier was obligated to exercise
good faith in handling third-party actions against the insured: "And
this duty is not lessened by the existence of excess insurance but is ex-
tended to include the excess carrier within the shelter of the obliga-
tion.""
5
In recognition of this Tenth Circuit extension, one author has stated
that:
If the primary carrier violates this duty by failing to exercise good faith
or ordinary care, whatever may be the rule, it probably will be held
liable to repay to the excess carrier such sums as it has been required
to pay as the result of the misconduct of the primary carrier." 0
A similar conclusion was reached by another author who adduced:
"[Tiheoretically no legal reason or bar exists why an excess carrier
cannot recover from the primary carrier. 
'11
7
These commentators, while offering no demonstrable reason for
such an extension, suggest that since there is "no legal reason or bar"
in opposition, the bad faith cause of action should be adopted. This
reasoning is both circuitous and erroneous. The underlying basis for
implying bad faith is contractual privity. Absent that, the question
which must be raised is whether or not there is a persuasive policy
reason for adopting the bad faith cause of action which negates the
lack of privity and requires such an application in contravention of
established contract law. From this perspective it seems clear that,
even in the Tenth Circuit which has recognized bad faith in the pri-
mary excess relationship, sufficient policy reasons have not been formu-
lated.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly the California courts will not be enthused by the fact
that the creation of such a cause of action would increase the already
another absent a specific contractual right." Id. at 582. Contra, Continental Cas. Co.
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961).
114. 285 F.2d at 581.
115. Id. Note, however, that the court did recognize that no contractual privity ex-
isted between the two insurers and therefore implied no subrogation rights.
116. Knepper, supra note 109, at 211 (emphasis added).
117. Bloom, supra note 109, at 238.
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prolific amount of insurance litigation in both the trial and appel-
late levels in the state. Perhaps this negative factor could be out-
weighed by the possibility that the creation of such a cause of action
might increase the amount of lawsuits that are settled by primary in-
surers before trial in situations with an excess carrier waiting in the
wings. Currently, the California primary carrier is not required to
settle such cases, since there have been no bad faith cases against
primary insurers where an excess carrier provided coverage. Theoret-
ically, such a cause of action could decrease the number of cases going
to trial, and perhaps offset the increased number of bad faith suits
filed between primary and excess carriers. But surely any change
premised on this hypothesis should be supported by something beyond
theoretical speculation.
In the final analysis, there is a genuine controversy as to the com-
plexion this new found duty of good faith should assume. Essentially,
the courts will have to grapple with the question of whether or not
an excess carrier should benefit from the stringent duty of good faith
and fair dealing that a primary insurer currently owes to its assured.' 18
Whether the California courts utilize equitable subrogation or an inde-
pendent adaptation of bad faith to subvert the privity problem, the
excess carrier would benefit, thus being exculpated from the liability
for which it accepted premiums. Moreover, the ultimate subsidizer
of litigation between primary and excess carriers would be the assured
through the medium of higher premiums, and yet the assured has no
interest in which one of the carriers pays the bill. There is simply
no persuasive policy reason why an excess carrier should receive a
"windfall" from a newly formulated application of the standard of good
faith, and absent such a policy rationale, California should not extend
the bad faith cause of action to the primary-excess carrier suit.
Joseph P. Lawrence, Jr.
118. Obviously, this will be the result if the court sanctions the equitable subrogation
approach. It has been suggested that this approach may not be appropriate. In light
of the sophistication of the excess carrier, the court should be inclined to force the
insurer to take steps to protect its own interests. Knepper, supra note 109, at 208.
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